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REALITY'S BITE
KERRI LYNN STONE*

1. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turned fifty last year, and as
scholars, judges, and the rest of the world reflect upon its past and
continuing impact, attention naturally turns to the courts', specifically the
Supreme Court's, most recent opinions, interpretations, and doctrines.
Courts' drawing of lines, interpretation of terms, and promulgation of
doctrines will dictate, for better or worse, the efficacy and ultimately the
legacy of the statute and its success in affording equality of opportunity to
and in the workplace. By far, the most pivotal thing to watch as this is done
is whether and how courts take so-called workplace realities into account
when making decisions that must factor in policy implications and "real
world" ramifications.
The realities of the workplace have been captured by years of socioscientific, industrial organizational, and other psychological research.
Human behavior and thought, interpersonal dynamics, and organizational
behavior, with all of their nuances and fine points, are now better
understood than they have ever been before, but unless they are used to
inform and buttress the rules of law and interpretations promulgated by
courts, Title VII's ability to successfully regulate the workplace and to rid
it of discrimination will be threatened. As Linda Hamilton Krieger and
Susan T. Fiske pointed out in 2006, "[a]ntidiscrimination law has long
incorporated and reified factual suppositions about the nature of
prejudice . . . But well-established insights from psychological science,
accumulated over fifty years of peer-reviewed, replicated research, has
called these suppositions into serious doubt, if not discredited them
entirely." I
*Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. J.D., New York University School
of Law; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University. I would also like to thank my research
assistants, Stephanie Klein, Deedee Bitran, and Ingrid Cepero for all of their able assistance, as well as
my husband, Josh Stone, and my son, Dylan Stone, for making the experience of writing this piece
possible and fun.
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This article expands upon that premise, lamenting judges, and
specifically justices having eschewed available research and other insights
into workplace realities, in favor of their own intuited sense of workplace
Further, this article observes an
dynamics, tendencies, and trends.
interesting asymmetry to how and when so-called "real-world"
considerations have been taken into account by the Supreme Court: turning
a blind eye to workplace realities that might aid in crafting legal standards
and interpretations that do not render legal recourse practically inaccessible
to plaintiffs, while overplaying workplace realities and reality-based
concerns like those about litigation floodgates when it comes to defendantfriendly holdings and constructions. More balance and transparency is
needed when courts weigh the policy considerations that underlie a given
decision, and these considerations should be informed, wherever possible,
by legitimate sources, and not by caricaturish and monolithic premises too
often employed by the judiciary.
In the summer of 2013, in a national legal climate that many have
2
described as hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court issued two opinions addressing Title VII. While one dealt with
retaliation claims under the statute and the other with sexual harassment,
they both engaged in the construction of terms to craft and retool standards
3
under which claims brought are adjudicated.
I See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 997, 1061-62 (2006);
see also Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. REv. 313, 319 (2010) ("[G]reater
contextualization of workplace circumstances before courts make dismissal decisions based on an
abbreviated paper record - context regarding the decision."); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common
Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal's Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 1, 60 (2011) (discussing how a different interpretation of Iqbal "may avert the effect of
stereotypes and implicit bias on judicial decision making at the pleading stage" of employment
discrimination cases); Kate Webber, Correctingthe Supreme Court-Will It Listen? Using the Models of
Judicial Decision-Makingto Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 305, 305-306 (2014) ("[S]cholars have long debated the question of what drives judicial decisions.
They generally agree that judges' individual political preferences play a significant, or even dominant,
role in case outcomes ... The legal community, however, has been slow to incorporate these theories
and evidence into ... analysis of pertinent issues.")
2 See Michele A. Whitham, Supreme Court Makes it Harderfor Employees to Bring Suits
Under

Title

VII,

FOLEY

HOAG

EDUCATION
2

ALERT

(Aug.

15,

2013),

http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/ 013/august/supreme-court-makes-itharder-for-employees-to-bring-suits-under-title-vii; Julia E. Judish et. al., Impact of Supreme Court
Pro-Employer Title VII Decisions Blunted by State Laws, PILLSBURY CLIENT ALERT (July 8, 2013),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert20l378LitigationhmpactofSupremeCourtTit
leVIIRulingsBlunted.pdf; see also Audrey Williams June, In Case Involving Medical School, CourtSets
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (June 24,
Higher Bar for Workers Who Allege Retaliation, THE
0
4
2013), http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/1 00 5/; Stacy L. Douglas, Supreme Court Rulings
2013),
9,
(Sept.
Define Standards Favorable to Employers, MARTINDALE.COM
http://www.martindale.com/civil-rights-law/article-Wood-Smith-Henning-Berman-LLP1955884.htm.
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524 (2013); see also Vance v.
3
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2450 (2013).
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In one case, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), the Court held that despite the fact that a claim of
discrimination brought under Title VII's core provision requires the
plaintiff to show merely that unlawful discrimination was a substantial
motivating factor behind the adverse employment action, a claim of
retaliation brought under the statute requires a showing by the plaintiff that
but-for the demonstrated retaliation, the adverse action (like a firing) would
not have happened. 4 This holding has been critically received by
practitioners and scholars who believe that such a stringent standard will
make retaliation cases, in which the inherently subjective, complex
decision-making process surrounding employment decisions already makes
them capable of being muddied (whether organically or by design),
practically impossible to win. 5 This, critics say, cannot possibly be what
Congress intended when it crafted the statute. 6 Critics also fear that
protected activity under Title VII will be chilled by employees'
understanding of the futility of bringing a retaliation claim. 7
In the other case, Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013),
the Court narrowed the definition of the term "supervisor" for purposes of
imposing the more plaintiff-friendly standard for supervisory harassment as
opposed to the more stringent standard for co-worker harassment.8 Again,
critics believe that this narrow definition leaves victims of harassment with
inadequate protection and will deter the vindication of rights under the
statute. 9 In both cases, the Court appeared to weigh the policy implications
4
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
5
See infra note 62.
6
See Matthew A. Krimski, Uni. Of Tex. Sw. Med Ctr. v. Nassar: Undermining the National
Policy Against Discrimination, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 132, 145 (2014); see also Sandra F. Sperino
& Suja A. Thomas, Fakers & Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. C. R. & C. L. 223, 224 (2014) ("Congress never
expressed any intention to limit the number of claims heard by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) or the courts based on concerns about the sheer volume of such claims. Nor did
Congress express any intent that the courts use the substantive law to screen for false retaliation
cases.").
7
See Abigail Rubenstein, High Court Poised To Shape LandscapeForRetaliationSuits, LAW
360 (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/434764/high-court-poised-to-shae-landscapefor-retaliation-suits (stating, while discussing Nassar before it was decided, that "rilf, in fact, the
employer carries the day in this case and the but-for standard is adopted with respect to retaliation
claims, it should definitely have a chilling effect on the frequency and the potency of such claims."');
see also Alyssa E. Lambert, Supreme Court debates causation standard for employee retaliation
claims, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE (May 16, 2013), Solomon Jones, Supreme Court's
EEOC
rulings erode
workers' lob
security, AXIS
PHILLY
(July
3,
2013),
http://axisphilly.org/article/supreme-courts-eeoc-rulings-erode-workers-iob-security/
("Together, the
two cases [Nassar and Vancel have a chilling effect on American workers. They make all workers more
vulnerable to the whims of employers, and leave workers with few options for relief.").
8
See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448.
9 See, e.g., Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 ("[lIt matters whether a harasser is a supervisor or
simply a co-worker."); see also Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) ("An employer is
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of leaving what it felt was too much room for exploitative plaintiffs to
essentially extort a payout while turning a blind eye to phenomena and
realities that will render their determinations fatal to many colorable claims
and subversive to the statute's enumerated goals. o
II. BACKGROUND

Under core anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it is an "unlawful employment practice" to "discriminate
against any individual . .. because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."11 Title VII's anti-retaliation provision states, in
relevant part:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees .. . because he has opposed ...
an unlawful employment practice ... or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing ... ."12
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that sexual
harassment, or, "unwelcome sexual advances that create an offensive or
hostile working environment," or other sex-based "conduct [that] has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment," did, in fact, constitute a discriminatory alteration of an
employee's "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 13
Liability for workplace harassment, however, would be construed to
hinge upon the employment status of the alleged harasser. 14 On one hand,
where a victim alleges that he or she was harassed by a co-worker,
employer liability is only triggered where the employer was negligent in its

subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee."); see also Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) ("[A] tangible employment action taken by the
supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer.").
See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531; Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2451.
10
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1964).
11
12
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (West 1964).
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
13
14 See, e.g., Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439 ("If the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker,
the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases which the
harasser is a supervisor, however, different rules apply."); Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654,
660 (1999) ("An employer may be held liable for the harassment of one employee by a fellow employee
(a non-supervisor) if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.").
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maintenance and control of the workplace environment and conditions.15
On the other hand, where the alleged harasser is deemed a supervisor and
the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action which is "a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits," the employer will be
held strictly liable for the harassment. 16
But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape
liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior
and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the
preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided.17
A. Vance
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Court confronted the issue of
precisely how to define the term supervisor for the purpose of engaging in a
harassment liability analysis.1 8 The Court held that vicarious liability for
supervisory sexual harassment would only attach when the putative
supervisor was one whom "the employer has empowered that employee to
take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a
'significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits."' 9 The Court rejected
the "nebulous definition of a 'supervisor' advocated in the EEOC
Guidance," as well as the plaintiffs "reliance on colloquial uses of the
term," thus spurning a definition more likely to resonate with an
understanding held by employees. 20
The Court seemed to prioritize in its reasoning the crafting of a
definition that permitted supervisory status to be "readily determined," and
not, as the EEOC's definition would, "to depend on a highly case-specific
evaluation of numerous factors," and "confound jurors." 2 1 This looks to
signify the triumph of ease of disposition over the real-world
considerations of comportment with key players' (employees')
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439; Curry, 195 F.3d at 660.
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761.
Id. at 765.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439.
Id. at 2443.
Id
Id at 2443-44.
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expectations and perceptions when infusing words with meaning. While the
Court maintained that the term had "varying meanings both in colloquial
usage and in the law," 22 many scholars and commentators have critiqued
its analysis. In the words of Professor Henry Chambers:
[T]he Court has mixed two different concepts.... The definition the
Court adopted may be easier to apply but may not be particularly
related to the original issue underlying the affirmative defense-when
an employer should be responsible for HWE harassment.

...

Limiting

who is a supervisor by using an easy-to-apply definition of
"supervisor" may limit liability, but it is not clear that such limitation
is more consistent with the purpose of the affirmative defense than
using a somewhat less clear definition.... [H]ow an employee
experiences the supervisor/coworker's power in the workplace would
3
also seem relevant. 2
Professor Chambers is correct; the Court's disregard for the manner in
which the victim of sexual harassment experiences his or her harasser's
power in the workplace is significant. It is significant because when the
Supreme Court contoured the scope of supervisor liability for sexual
harassment in 1998, it acknowledged that actions taken by a supervisor are,
in essence, actions taken by the employer that interfere with the terms and
24
conditions of employment that Title VII concerns itself with. From the
perspective of a victimized employee, irrespective of whether a harasser
technically possesses certain powers, to the extent that he controls aspects
and the atmosphere of her employment he is acting to color, if not corrode,
25
the terms and conditions of her employment when he harasses her. The
practical effects of this opinion were felt in real workplaces around the
country as lower courts applied this holding. Headlines like "10TH CIR.:
MCDONALD'S FRANCHISEE NOT LIABLE FOR SHIFT LEADER'S
SEXUAL ASSAULT OF TEEN WORKER" 26 practically scream what has
happened as Vance's holding has been applied: "A restaurant shift leader
was not a Title VII supervisor, and the employer therefore was not liable
for the off-site sexual activity between the employee and an under-age
22 Id. at 2446.
23
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: StrengtheningIt
or KillingIt? 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (2014) (emphasis added).
24
Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54 ("When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action
resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is
actionable under Title VII.").
25

Harassment,

U.S.

EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfmn (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
26

WOLTERS KLUWER EMPLOYMENT LAW DAILY, Aug. 16, 2013,2013 WL 4426215.
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worker, the Tenth Circuit held, applying the Supreme Court's recent
holding in Vance v. Ball State University." 27
The dissent in Vance actually came out and said that the Supreme
Court's distinction between supervisory harassment and co-worker
harassment "correspond[ed] to the realities of the workplace," 28 noting
that:
Exposed to a fellow employee's harassment, one can walk away or tell
the offender to "buzz off." A supervisor's slings and arrows, however,
are not so easily avoided. An employee who confronts her harassing
supervisor risks, for example, receiving an undesirable or unsafe work
assignment or an unwanted transfer. She may be saddled with an
excessive workload or with placement on a shift spanning hours
disruptive of her family life. And she may be demoted or fired. Facing
such dangers, she may be reluctant to blow the whistle on her
superior, whose "power and authority invests his or her harassing
conduct with a particular threatening character." . . . In short, as
Faragherand Ellerth recognized, harassment by supervisors is more
likely to cause palpable harm and to persist unabated than similar
conduct by fellow employees. 29
The dissent in Vance lamented the majority's removal from the ambit of
the definition of the term supervisor those who "control the day-to-day
schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to those
formally empowered to take tangible employment actions." 30 The dissent
noted that it would have held that supervisory status is demonstrated by
one's "authority to direct an employee's daily activities." 3 1
B. Nassar
Perhaps no case better underscores judges' propensity to overstate
workplace "realities" when it comes to anticipating insidious motives and
behavior on the part of plaintiffs, engaging in fanciful parades of horribles,
and crafting standards to closing "floodgates" that may or may not actually
exist, than University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.32
In this 2013 Supreme Court case, the Court confronted the issue of whether
the proper standard for proving a retaliation claim under Title VII was that
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2456 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id
Id at 2455.

Id
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2517.
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retaliation be a substantial factor in the decision to effectuate the adverse
action, as is the standard for proving unlawful status-based discrimination,
33
or that retaliation be the "but-for" cause of the decision. The Supreme
Court found the latter to be the case. 34
The Court also grounded its decision in a discussion of causation in tort
law, noting that "[c]ausation in fact- i.e., proof that the defendant's
conduct did in fact cause the plaintiffs injury-is a standard requirement
of any tort claim.

..

. This includes federal statutory claims of workplace

discrimination." 35 The Court went on to note that generally, this meant that
the plaintiff had to, as a "default rule," demonstrate "'that the harm would
not have occurred' in the absence of that is, but for-the defendant's
conduct." 36
The Court made a big point of distinguishing between the statute's
prohibition of class or status-based discrimination on one hand and its
prohibition of employer retaliation for an employee's opposition to
employment discrimination and her submission of or support for a
37
complaint claiming employment discrimination on the other hand. The
latter category, the Court noted, consisted of prohibitions premised on
38
protected employee conduct rather than "personal traits." Finally, the
Court looked to its history in construing causation standards promulgated
9
by Title VII and other anti-discrimination legislation.3 The Court noted
that in 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, it had effectively defined the
prohibition against discrimination "because of' protected class status as
forbidding an employer's allowing of protected class status to be a
40
"motivating" or "substantial" factor in the employer's decision. This
standard, termed by the Court a "lessened causation standard," was
41
codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act).
The Court also adverted to its decision regarding the proper causation
standard under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in of 1967
(ADEA) in Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc.42 In Gross, the Court
held that ADEA plaintiffs must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

37

Id.

38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Id. at 2525-28.
Id. at 2525. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).

at 2522-23, 2526.
at 2534.
at 2524.
at 2525.
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the prohibited discrimination, not merely a substantial motivating factor. 43
The Court's analysis was premised on the plain language in, legislative
history of, and Congressional intent behind the ADEA and its prohibition
of discrimination "because of' age. 44 Declining to apply the standard
construed in Price Waterhouse, the Court emphasized Congress's choice
not to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII in 1991.45 The Court
also noted that the Gross Court explicitly attached significance to the fact
that the 1991 amendments to Title VII, signified that "the motivating-factor
standard was not an organic part of Title VII and thus could not be read
into the ADEA."46
Interestingly, while the majority opinion devoted significant time and
space to engaging the arguments of the plaintiff and the U.S. Government,
exhorting them to employ rules of statutory construction, analysis, and
interpretation of the language, history, and structure of anti-discrimination,
it failed to address the underlying realities of the workplace that should
have factored into a determination of the most workable and efficacious
standard for causation in retaliation cases. 47 When the Court stated that in
the course of its analysis, "[t]ext may not be divorced from context," it was
referring to the context of the statute's negotiation, passage, and drafting,
and not the context of the workplaces it regulates and what dynamics
govern their environments and interactions. 48
Moreover, the policy underpinnings of the Court's holding focused not
on the ramifications that a "but-for" causation standard would have on
effectuating the legislation at issue's goal, stemming retaliatory behavior in
the workplace and freeing employees to pursue recourse under Title VII for
perceived violations without fear of retaliation, but rather, on avoiding
opening the proverbial "floodgates of litigation." 49 Indeed, the Court noted
that:
The proper interpretationand implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its
causation standardhave central importance to thefair and responsible
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigationsystems. This is of
particularsignificance because claims of retaliation are being made

43

Id. at 180.

44
45
46

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527.
See id.

47
48
49

Id. at 2528-31.
Id. at 2530.
See id. at 2531.

Id.
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with ever-increasingfrequency. The number of these claims filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has nearly
doubled in the past 15 years-from just over 16,000 in 1997 to over
31,000 in 2012.... Indeed, the number of retaliationclaimsfiled with
the EEOC has now outstripped those for every type of status-based
discriminationexcept race. 50
The majority also worried about the danger of a lessened causation
standard adding to or inviting "the filing of frivolous claims, which would
siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, and
courts to combat workplace harassment." 5 1 By way of illustration, the
majority posited:
The case of an employee who knows that he or she is about to be fired
for poor performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just
transferred to a different assignment or location. To forestall that
lawful action, he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded
charge of racial, sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when the
unrelated employment action comes, the employee could allege that it
is retaliation. If respondent were to prevail in his argument here, that
claim could be established by a lessened causation standard, all in
order to prevent the undesired change in employment circumstances.
Even if the employer could escape judgment after trial, the lessened
causation standard would make it far more difficult to dismiss dubious
claims at the summary judgment stage. 52
Finally, while the majority worried that the costs, "both financial and
reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of
any discriminatory or retaliatory intent," would be raised if retaliation
merely needed to be shown to be a motivating factor in an employer's
decision, it did not pay much attention to the ramifications of making the
standard for proving a retaliation case impossibly high.53
The dissent, as might be expected, emphasized the centrality of an
effective anti-retaliation provision to an effective anti-discrimination
statute, noting that "[r]etaliation for complaining about discrimination is
tightly bonded to the core prohibition and cannot be disassociated from
it."54 The dissent refuted the majority's position as to the language of the

50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 2531.
Id. at 2531-32.
Id. at 2532.
Id.
Id. at 2535.
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statute, noting that the term "because of' does not always compel a "but
for" analysis, and observing that under the new reading of the statute, a
plaintiff claiming retaliation will not be able to prevail if her firing was
motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors.5 5
Even as the dissent quoted Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price
Waterhouse, which noted that "the law has long recognized that ... leaving
the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove 'but-for' causation would
be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the
concept of duty of care" 56 and posited that "a strict but-for test is
particularly ill suited to employment discrimination cases," 57 it never

scratched the surface as to precisely why this might be the case, other than
to quote the dissent in Gross: "[e]ven if the test is appropriate in some tort
contexts, 'it is an entirely different matter to determine a "but-for" relation
when ...
considering, not physical forces, but the mind-related
characteristics that constitute motive.' 58 The dissent was content to
describe the new standard generally as compelling the trier to "engage in a
hypothetical inquiry" that may very well "demand the impossible" by
"challeng[ing] the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful
and unknowable state of affairs" without delving at all into the unique
application of the standard in the workplace. 59 The dissent even went so far
as to quote a sponsor of Title VII from its legislative history, opining that a
"sole cause" standard for the substantive discrimination provision would be
unworkable because "[1]ife does not shape up that way." 60 The dissent then
flat-out accused the majority of "lack[ing] sensitivity to the realities of life
at work" but failed to elaborate on this unworkability with any kind of
discussion of the contemporary American workplace. 61
This opinion has been criticized by numerous legal scholars, 62 but it
55
Id. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 2531 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989)).
57
Id. at 2547.
58
Id. (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
59
Id. at 2547.
60
Id
61
Id
62
See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII:
Strengthening It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REv. 1161, 1191-93 (2014) (noting that in Nassar, the
Supreme Court "narrowed retaliation in a way that may not provide nearly as much protection for the
employee as Title VII might suggest. Logically, the result of narrowing the retaliation claim will be to
discourage employees from challenging unlawful employment practices. Given that the retaliation
clause exists to support and encourage employees to challenge unlawful employment practices, the
narrowing of the retaliation claim is not just problematic for the employee; it is problematic for Title
VII and the workplace."); id. at 1186 ("Even though the Court acknowledged-as it had to-that the
retaliation claim is a legitimate cause of action, it narrowed the cause of action when it logically could
have made it broader. In deciding Nassar, the Supreme Court seemed willing to go only as far as Title
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should be seen as evidence of a disturbing judicial trend of both eschewing
considerations of workplace realities and providing a critically imbalanced
portrayal of what they are and how they operate when it comes to
plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments.
III. "WORKPLACE REALITIES"

The year 2013 was not the first time that Justice Ginsburg had addressed
workplace realities in the course of drafting an opinion (in this case, a
dissent), but it was one of the scant few times that the Supreme Court had
ever, in any context, mentioned or otherwise factored in "workplace
realities." In 2012, the Supreme Court held that, due to sovereign
immunity, states could not be subjected to suits for damages by employees
alleging violations of the self-care provision of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). This was due to the fact that the abrogation of
sovereign immunity in that instance would exceed congressional power. 63
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg took on and disputed the plurality's
contentions that Congress was at a loss for "wide-spread evidence of sex
discrimination ... in the administration of sick leave" and that "state
employees likely 'could take leave for pregnancy-related illnesses ....
under paid sick-leave plans. "'64 She noted that, on the contrary, "Congress
heard evidence that existing sick-leave plans were inadequate to ensure that
women were not fired when they needed to take time out to recover their
strength and stamina after childbirth" and that the self-care provision at
issue was responsive to the concerns that stemmed from that evidence. 65
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg argued that Congress had deliberately stayed
away from crafting the FMLA as a pregnancy-centered statute, fearing that
such a focus would "ward off the unconstitutional discrimination it

VII explicitly allowed and showed no deference to prior Courts that had thought about the causation
issue. That willingness to rethink a basic aspect of Title VII is troublesome, given the Court's apparent
hostility to parts of Title VII."); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court's 2012-2013 Labor and
Employment Law Decisions: The Song Remains the Same, 17 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 157, 167
(2013) ("the decision is undoubtedly a loss for employees"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects
Each of Us the Supreme Court Term in Review, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 375 (2013) ("In University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court made it more difficult for employees to
successfully sue for claims that they were retaliated against for complaining of discrimination."); Alan
Rupe et. al., U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in Title VII Retaliation
Actions, 83 J. KAN. B.A. 24, 28 (2014) ("Although its impact on summary judgment will be small,
Nassar will substantially affect employment trials and pretrial submissions in all but Title VII
discrimination cases.").
63 See generally Coleman v. Ct. App. Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
6
Id. at 1346 (internal quotations omitted) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

65

Id
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believed would attend a pregnancy-only leave requirement." 66 Citing
Congress's stated concern that "[a] law providing special protection to
women . .
in addition to being inequitable, runs the risk of causing
discriminatory treatment [because] [e]mployers might be less inclined to
hire women," Justice Ginsburg observed that this concern "was solidly
grounded in workplace realities." 67 She noted that, as evidence of this:
After this Court upheld California's pregnancy-only leave policy in
California Fed., Don Butler, President of the Merchants and
Manufacturers Association, one of the plaintiffs in that case, told
National Public Radio reporter Nina Totenberg that, as a result of the
decision, "many employers will be prone to discriminate against
women in hiring and hire males instead.". . .Totenberg replied, "But
that is illegal, too"-to which Butler responded, "Well, that is illegal,
but try to prove it."68
Justice Ginsburg's instinct to look to the actual way in which
motivations are formed, acted upon, and even obscured, as a way of
bearing out the speculations of Congress is all too rare on the Court, and
among the judiciary in general. 69 In fact, an early 2014 Westlaw search of
the term "workplace realities" in the database that scans all federal cases
only turns up fourteen results, Vance and this case being two of them. 70
Although there are clearly other ways of conveying a weighing of or
engagement with workplace realities, this is still somewhat telling, and
legal scholarship on the issue reveals a host of criticism of the fact that
workplace realities are all too absent from judicial calculus and analysis in
both form and substance.71
The only other Supreme Court case in which workplace realities were
mentioned or invoked is in the dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Ginsburg in the now-defunct Lily Ledbetter decision. 72 Criticizing the
66
Id
67
Id
68
Id
69
Id.
70
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2434; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1327.
71
See Ronald Turner, Pliable Precedents, PlausiblePolicies, and Lilly Ledbetter 's Loss, 30
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 336, 364 (2009); Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the SameActor Doctrine Sustains Discriminationin the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1117, 1127
(2008); Kerri Lynn Stone, Consenting Adults?: Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual
HarassmentAre FaringBetter in Court Than Those Who Say No ... and Why They Shouldn't, 20 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 58 (2008); Kara M. Farina, When Does Discrimination "Occur?": The Supreme
Court's Limitation on an Employee's Ability to Challenge Discriminatory Pay Under Title VII, 38
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 249, 273 (2008); Bindu George, Ledbetter v. Goodyear: A Court Out of
Touch with the Realities of the American Workplace, 18 TEMP. POL. & Cv. RTs. L. REv. 253 (2008).
72
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).

240

JOURNAL OFCIVIL RIGHTS& ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 28:2

majority for being so dismissive of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
as allowing employers to challenge discriminatorily disparate paychecks
each time a new one is received, rather than saying that the applicable
statute of limitations runs after a discrete period of time, Justice Ginsburg
explained that the interpretation was "in line with the real-world
characteristics of pay discrimination," and that it "mirror[ed] workplace
realities," earning it "at least respectful attention." 73
A. An Odd Asymmetry: The Supreme Court Fails to Accountfor Workplace
Realities that Touch on Plaintifs'Diffculties and Defendants'
Behavior in its Determination of a CausationStandardfor Title VII
Retaliation, but Assesses and Addresses "Floodgate"Concerns that
Touch on the "Realities"Concerning Complex, Undeserving, Litigious
Plaintiffs.
As noted, in Nassar, the Court remarkably failed to appreciate the
complexity of the phenomenon of workplace retaliation as it actually
occurs. Its protracted discussion of statutory design and construction
included no consideration or mention of what Congress's intent with
respect to the applicable standard might have been considering the
dynamics of workplace retaliation. This is despite its earlier recognitions of
the centrality of an anti-retaliation provision in Title VII and
acknowledgement of what might happen in the workplace without a strong
anti-retaliation provision.
In 2006, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Title VII's antiretaliation provision, its teeth, and that which "seeks to secure that primary
with an
objective by preventing an employer from interfering . .
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's basic
guarantees," should be interpreted "to provide broad protection from
retaliation [to] help [to] ensure the cooperation upon which
74
accomplishment of the Act's primary objective depends." Moreover, in
2009 the Supreme Court acknowledged the reality that the "[f]ear of
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing
75
their concerns about bias and discrimination."
Despite these recognitions, and despite the entreaties of various amicus
briefs for the Nassar Court to take workplace realities into account, the
73 Id. at 655, 666 n.6.
74 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63, 67 (2006).
Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009)
75
(citing Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 20 (2005)).
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Court turned a blind eye. Indeed, one amicus brief noted that "[i]n the
employment context ... an employer typically has multiple reasons for
making an adverse decision," that "very few (if any) employees have
unblemished employment records," and that "[a]s a result, employers
would effectively have permission to consider an employee's protected
conduct in their decision-making with impunity, so long as the employee
could not disprove an independently sufficient reason for the employer's
adverse action." 76 It thus projected that:
[e]scalating the plaintiffs burden to a 'but-for' standard in retaliation
cases would create a chilling effect. Claimants . .. would face
prohibitive difficulty in proving their claims. Their unlikelihood of
success on a retaliation claim would create an additional incentive to
acquiesce to discrimination in the workplace, silencing vulnerable
groups of employees from seeking redress for workplace
discrimination. 77
Another amicus brief noted that "[t]oo often public schools and
universities censor and retaliate against dissenters for their speech, but
cloak those adverse actions in seemingly benign justifications. A but-for
standard facilitates such punishment of disfavored speakers and thus
imperils the marketplace of ideas." 78 Still another predicted that "[w]ithout
adequate protections against retaliation, employees who have been
discriminated against - those who have been harassed, for example, or
demoted because of their race - may rationally decide to remain silent until
they are out of their employer's reach, in other words, until they quit or are
fired." 79 Other briefs echoed these realities and this sentiment,8 0 but the
76
Brief for American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee et al., as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484),
2013 WL 1462054, at * 13.
77 Id. at *14.
78
Brief for the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education and Alliance Defending
Freedom, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517 (2013) (No. 12-484), 2013 WL 1462055.
79
Brief for Committee of Interns and Residents Seiu, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484), 2013 WL
1557466.
80
Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484), 2013 WL
1557464 ("A sole cause standard in retaliation claims would eviscerate enforcement of Title VII's
retaliation provision. An employer would prevail merely by identifying one reason other than
discrimination that might have played a role in the decision to take the adverse action against the
employee. If the promise of protection from retaliation was rendered meaningless, enforcement of the
substantive provisions of Title VII would be substantially undercut."); Brief for the Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education and Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (No. 12-484), 2013 WL
1462055 ("Under a but-for standard, First Amendment retaliation litigants would be handicapped in
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Court's majority refused to so much as address these arguments, either in
the context of the policy soundness of the decision or in the context of
congressional intent.
On the other hand, the Court was incredibly quick to conjure up and
posit a duplicitous would-be fired employee-turned-plaintiff who would
wield her lawsuit as a sword rather than a shield. 81 In contrast to its
analysis of congressional intent and statutory construction, the Court's
policy-based rationales for its construction readily invoked dire probable
consequences in holding as the plaintiffs and their amici would have it
hold.82 The Court noted, in fact, that as a matter of policy, a "proper
interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its causation
standard have central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of
resources in the judicial and litigation systems." 8 3 It elaborated upon this
proposition, observing that:
This is of particular significance because claims of retaliation are
being made with ever-increasing frequency. The number of these
claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has nearly doubled in the past 15 years-from just over
16,000 in 1997 to over 31,000 in 2012.... Indeed, the number of
those for
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has now outstripped
84
race.
except
discrimination
every type of status-based
Moreover, the Court noted that the very notion that a "dubious" claim
might survive summary judgment and cost an employer money to litigate,
was, in fact, a good, policy-based reason to insist on a more stringent
causation standard:
Even if the employer could escape judgment after trial, the lessened
causation standard would make it far more difficult to dismiss dubious
claims at the summary judgment stage... . It would be inconsistent
with the structure and operation of Title VII to so raise the costs, both
financial and reputational, on an employer whose actions were not in
fact the result of any discriminatory or retaliatory intent.85
attempts to vindicate their constitutional rights. The requirement that they prove that discrimination was
the sole cause of an adverse educational or employment action would dramatically enhance the
difficulty of their cases, and thus diminish the availability of remedies. Conversely, this altered standard
would relieve government officials of the salutary incentives to fairness that viable retaliation claims
bring.").
See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
81
82
See id. at 2533.
83 Id. at 2531.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 2532.
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The asymmetry shown by the Court between its conception of a simple
employer, who can be shown to have either clearly retaliated or not, and
who the Court prioritized sparing costs in as early a stage as possible, and
its conception of a feckless, but duplicitous plaintiff, "tempted" to
manufacture claims only to cloak herself in the overly-generous protections
of Title VII, is staggering.
1. Unjust Depictions of Manipulative, Devious Plaintiffs and Victimized
Defendant Employers
This imbalance is reflective of a judicial system that, as many scholars
have argued, has erected procedural impediments to plaintiffs' success, 86
and that, as some scholars have posited, harbors out-and-out bias against
plaintiffs. According to Professor Michael Selmi:
The primary reason discrimination cases are so hard to prove has to do
with the bias courts bring to their analyses. By the term bias I do not
mean that courts hold or express animus toward discrimination cases,
though some courts undoubtedly do, but instead I mean that courts
approach cases from a particular perspective that reflects a bias
against the claims .

. .

. [I]t seems that the general consensus today is

that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has been
sharply diminished, and those who take this view are reluctant to find
discrimination absent compelling evidence.87
Judge Mark W. Bennett observes that:
[T]he federal judiciary has become increasingly unfriendly towards
employment discrimination cases going to trial. Those of us in the
legal profession not living under a large rock would be hard pressed
not to have noticed this..

.

. Employment discrimination cases today

are to the federal judiciary what prisoner rights cases were before the
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996. In Yogi Berra
86
See, e.g., Lever v. Nw. Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1992) ("No rule of law says that
employees win all close cases."); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
DiscriminationPlaintiffs in FederalCourt: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 10405 (2009) ("The fear of judicial bias at both the lower and the appellate court levels may be
discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seeking relief in the federal courts.");
Pam Jenoff, As Equal as Others? Rethinking Access to DiscriminationLaw, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 85, 94
(2012) ("Despite the appearance of a comprehensive federal anti-discrimination scheme, the laws [. . ]
provide limited access to the claiming system."); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race
Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 909 (2006) ("Plaintiffs victories are a
rare event in employment discrimination litigation . . . ."); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
DiscriminationCases So Hardto Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) ("[T]he volume of employment
discrimination cases is said to reflect an excessive amount of costly nuisance suits.").
87
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 561-63 (2001).
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terms, it's ddjA vu all over again: "Plaintiffs claims lack merit,"
"Plaintiffs claims are frivolous," and.. ."Plaintiffs claims are
implausible"-all incantations heard with stunning frequency in the
federal district courts... . Two Cornell law professors, who have done

extensive empirical studies of "win" rates in employment
discrimination cases ... note, "The most significant observation about
the district courts' adjudication of employment discrimination cases is
the long-run lack of success for these plaintiffs relative to other
plaintiffs." 88
Where do these asymmetrical characterizations and depictions come
from? Media depictions of employment discrimination are rife with
imagery of greedy, undeserving plaintiffs looking to exploit their protected
class status, "milk the system," and even mask their own faults and foibles
with frivolous lawsuits. 89 As Professor Minna J. Kotkin has said:
Conservative pundits assert that employers are being held hostage by
the discrimination laws. They are besieged by frivolous claims and
forced into nuisance settlements to avoid out-of-control legal fees. If
they risk litigation, they are at the mercy of jury whims that can lead
to crippling awards. Employment discrimination claims are a sub-set
of the litigation explosion that is crippling American business and
making us non-competitive in the global marketplace.... The media
also contribute to questionable representations of employment
discrimination litigation. One study found that newspaper reports
reflected an 85% win rate for plaintiffs with average recoveries of
$1.1 million, when the docket entries showed a 32% win rate, and a
recovery average of $150,000. On the other hand, some social
scientists and legal scholars suggest that bias in the workplace
continues at subtle levels not readily amenable to resolution through
litigation as the law now stands.
The impact of conservative ideology is readily apparent, both in
88
Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From the "No Spittin', No Cussin' and No Summary
Judgment" Days of Employment DiscriminationLitigation to the "Defendant's Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment" Days: One Judge's Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
685, 697-98 (2013).
89
See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 104 (2009) ("we
should disclose at the outset our concluding view that results in the federal courts disfavor employment
discrimination plaintiffs. . . "); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) ("courts often seem mired in a belief that the claims are generally
unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs who have been given too many . . . breaks along the
way."); Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), The Virtual Repeal of Kennedy-Johnson Administrations'
PM),
20,
2013,
5:35
COLLEGE
(Nov.
HUFF
POST
'Signature Achievement',
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-nancy-gertner/the-virtual-repeal-of-kennedy-johnson("So little do the judges think of
administrations-signature-achievement_b_4311759.html
discrimination claims that they rarely allow them to get to a jury at all.").
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Congress and in the courts.... Some federal judges have publicly

expressed hostility to employment discrimination claims, and both
attorneys and litigants are under the perception that the federal
judiciary does not treat the claims or claimants with the same attention
and respect accorded commercial litigants. 90
Many scholars have observed that a look at the Supreme Court's most
recent Title VII jurisprudence paints a bleak picture in terms of its ability to
sustain its objectives. 9 1 As Professor Henry Chambers has observed:
[T]he Supreme Court's recent cases have suggested that the Court will
focus its interpretation of Title VII on its vision of the meaning of
Title VII's text, even if that is inconsistent with Title VII's overall
vision or the vision that Congress apparently had when it passed Title
VII and its various amendments....
The Court is rethinking Title VII doctrines.... Given this Court's
generally skeptical outlook on Title VII, that does not bode well for
Title VII's expansion to limits that will allow Title VII to serve its
original function of promoting full equality in the workplace.... If the
current trend continues, Title VII may be whittled down to its core
provisions. 92
Additionally, the Court has been selective as to when it chooses to be
responsive to so-called "floodgates" arguments, as well. In 2012, as the
Court formally recognized, and thus cemented, the judicially created
"ministerial exception" that bars the application of civil rights laws to
religious entities' employment relationships with those defined as
"ministers," it noted that:
The EEOC . . foresee[s] a parade of horribles that will follow our
recognition of a ministerial exception to employment discrimination
suits. According to the EEOC . . such an exception could protect
90
Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment
DiscriminationSettlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 114-15 (2007).
91
William R. Corbett, Calling on Congress: Take A Pagefrom Parliament'sPlaybook and
Fix Employment DiscriminationLaw, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 135 (2013); Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation in an Eeo World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 125 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court's retaliation
jurisprudence; specifically noting "In Clark County School District v. Breeden, decided in 2001, the
Court set lower courts on a path of markedly different doctrinal protections for internal discrimination
complaints versus external complaints. . . [Breeden's] primary significance is to deny retaliation
protection for internal complaints. . . The decision has had a devastating impact for employees
complaining internally about discrimination..."); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping
Away at Title VII: StrengtheningIt or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2014) ("in recent years,
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes has called
into question the future arc of Title VI doctrine.").
92
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: StrengtheningIt
or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1191-93 (2014).
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religious organizations from liability for retaliating against employees
for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury
or in a criminal trial. What is more, the EEOC contends, the logic of
the exception would confer on religious employers "unfettered
discretion" to violate employment laws by, for example, hiring
93
children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States.
However, the Court declined to explore the reaches the EEOC urged it
to. Instead, it reiterated that its holding was made within the confines of the
facts before it and readily dismissed the EEOC's concerns, observing that:
[T]he case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on
behalf of a minister, challenging her church's decision to fire her.
Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We
express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits . .
of the exception
There will be time enough to address the applicability
94
arise.
they
when
and
if
circumstances
to other
Despite this handy dismissal of what it termed a parade of horribles, the
Court nonetheless dwelled on the notion that the proverbial "floodgates" of
litigation would burst open when it rendered its opinion in Nassarin 2013:
[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the filing
of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by
employer, administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace
harassment. Consider in this regard the case of an employee who
knows that he or she is about to be fired for poor performance, given a
lower pay grade, or even just transferred to a different assignment or
location. To forestall that lawful action, he or she might be tempted to
make an unfounded charge of racial, sexual, or religious
discrimination; then, when the unrelated employment action comes,
the employee could allege that it is retaliation. If respondent were to
prevail in his argument here, that claim could be established by a
lessened causation standard, all in order to prevent the undesired
change in employment circumstances. 95
The Court cited explicitly to Vance and its determination that the value
in promulgating and choosing a standard "that can be readily applied" lay
in its predictability and in the fact that under such a standard, "supervisor
status will generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment."
Further, the court in Nassar observed that "[e]ven if the employer could
93
(2012).
94
95

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
Id.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
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escape judgment after trial, the lessened causation standard would make it
far more difficult to dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment
stage." 96 The Court's overriding concern, expressed in both opinions that

the floodgates of litigation would open for so-called dubious claims is
manifest.
IV. BEHAVIORAL REALISM

In their now-famous 2006 article, Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan T.
Fiske incisively critiqued employment discrimination jurisprudence, setting
forth the doctrine of behavioral realism, which "stands for the principle
that, in deciding which normative choice to make, the Court should, where
possible, use psychological science, not a priori intuitive psychological
theories, in describing, justifying, or predicting the consequences of its
chosen legal rule." 97 The authors took issue with the fact that "the
behavioral theories embedded in legal doctrines often go unstated. Even
when stated, they are often unexamined, and they are almost never
empirically tested, except perhaps by a small cadre of ...scholars whose
articles judges seldom read." 98 However, the authors explained, this is
particularly insidious because "once embedded in published decisions, a
behavioral theory can develop precedential legitimacy and for that reason
be difficult to modify, even if it is empirically unsound.... Behavioral
theories can thus enter and remain embedded in legal doctrine long after
they have been disconfirmed or superseded by advances in the empirical
social sciences." 99
Eight years later, this has never been more the case. Despite having
opportunities to inject sound, published conclusions about workplace
realities into the Title VII interpretation and line-drawing that it has been
asked to do, the Supreme Court has persisted in failing to avail itself of
virtually any scientifically-based insight or understanding of the workplace
scenarios, including supervisory harassment or retaliation, that it has been
asked to examine.
A. I/O Psychology

According to the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology,
96
Id. at 2532; see, e.g., Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2438, 2449.
97
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: Implicit Bias and DisparateTreatment, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 997, 1062 (2006).
98
Id. at 998.
99
Id at 999.
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1/0 psychology is "the scientific study of the workplace," in which "[r]igor
and methods of psychology are applied to issues of critical relevance to
business, including talent management, coaching, assessment, selection,
training, organizational development, motivation, leadership, and
performance." 00
1. Psychology Has an Immense Ability to Explain Phenomena or Inform
Insights that May Guide Courts When Weighing Policy
Arguments
Workplace-based psychology has long had the ability to lend predictive
and interpretative insight to projections about the dynamics and mechanics
of the workplace. A 1986 article published in the Journal of Applied
Psychologylol, for example, explored some of the dynamics of retaliation,
a phenomenon whose "realities" were arguably all but ignored in the
Nassar majority opinion. Referring to the phenomenon as "complex," the
article debunked some myths about retaliation that had presumably been
widely-held beliefs, which demonstrates that the judges' own intuition,
predictions, and modeling when it comes to projecting workplace behavior
10 2 For example, the article
and mechanics may not be borne out by reality.
reported upon a study in which it had been "assumed that the decision to
retaliate reflected an organizational choice, either a conscious strategy or a
decision of which top managers would be aware." 1 03 This assumption,
however, was "called into question by the results" of the study (which
looked at whistleblower scenarios), with the authors observing that while:
[R]etaliation was more comprehensive if the wrongdoing was
serious,... it was unrelated to the number of individuals who were
involved in the wrongdoing. Retaliation by the organization seemed to
be unrelated to the power of the whistle blower relative to the
organization; the only variable that consistently reduced the whistle
blower's power and increased the likelihood of retaliation was lack of
support from supervisors and managers.1 04
The Nassar court could have chosen to correspondingly consider how
retaliation foments and unfolds in such a complex way as to make proof
Professionals, SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY,
100
http://www.siop.org/tab_default/professionals-default.aspx (last visited July 16, 2014).
Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Retaliation Against Whistle Blowers: Predictors and
101
Effects, 71 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 137,137 (1986).

102
103

See id.
Id. at 141.

104

Id.

2015]

REALITY'SBITE

249

difficult, even as it contemplated how a shrewd plaintiff undeserving of
keeping her job or winning a Title VII case could abuse the system if the
standard were not reined in. As Professor Deborah Brake has noted, "[t]he
social science literature on bias and the dynamics of challenging
discrimination shows retaliation to be a powerful weapon of punishment
for persons who challenge the hierarchies of race and gender."105 She
discusses the ways in which social science has borne out phenomena that
underlie retaliation: victims' fears of reporting discrimination due to the
costs exacted by challenging workplace discrimination, hostility directed
toward those who challenge discrimination, and the ways in which the
looming specter of retaliation chills speech and action. 106
Using recently published studies, Professor Brake recited her analysis of
the mechanism of retaliation: its function is to both silence those who
would challenge perceived inequality and the status quo and to preserve the
existing power structure.10 7 Professor Brake was able to pierce several
misconceptions about retaliation and how it works by using social science
to buttress her conclusions, noting, for example, that "[a]n analysis of the
costs and benefits of reporting discrimination, rather than an 'ethic of
caretaking' or an aversion to conflict, best explains women's decisions not
to report discrimination."108 She also concluded something that would have
behooved the Court to factor in when it weighed the policy arguments
before it in Nassar: "Retaliation occurs with sufficient frequency to justify
perceptions of the high costs of reporting discrimination and support the
rationality of decisions not to do so."109
2. Courts Need to be Receptive to the Science Behind the Workplace in a
Variety of Contexts, Especially When Crafting Policy
Courts have long been, and continue to be, receptive to input from
psychologists who specialize in areas like industrial organizational
psychology. This includes informing their opinions with workplaceoriented and social science when it comes to certain issues, including
105
106

Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 25 (2005).
Id. at 28-29 (citing Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with

Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfactions with Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 240, 247-48

(1993)); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective on Confronting Sexism,
28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 168, 175 (2004); Charles Stangor et al., Reporting Discriminationin Public
and Private Contexts, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69 (2002); Janet K. Swim & Lauri L.
Hyers, "Excuse Me-What Did You Just Say?!": Women's Public and Private Responses to Sexist
Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 79 (1999)).

107
108
109

See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 25-42 (2005).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.

250

JOURNAL OFCIWL RIGHTS& ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 28:2

assessing plaintiffs' harm for the purposes of ascertaining liability or
110 Courts
damages in employment discrimination or harassment cases.
have been especially receptive when it comes to employment
discrimination cases in which the plaintiff alleges that a testing or other
screening procedure or mechanism operates in a discriminatory fashion and
an expert is consulted to inform the court as to issues like job-relatedness or
discriminatory impact.111 These cases tend to be brought under a disparate
impact theory, alleging, in essence, that a facially neutral practice or
procedure, like testing, effectively discriminated against a group by
disproportionately screening out its members.1 12 Federal courts have been
extremely receptive to workplace psychology-based testimony and to
availing themselves of the knowledge contained in it, even where
defendants in Title VII cases have been resistant.1 13
Perhaps the best known of those cases, Ricci v. DeStefano, was decided
by the Supreme Court in 2009.114 There, the Supreme Court considered the
question of whether and when an employer could engage in what would
qualify as disparate treatment under Title VII in order to stave off a valid
claim of disparate impact discrimination. The Court ultimately decided
that such action would be lawful only when the defendant had a "strong
basis in evidence" to believe that it would be liable for disparate impact

110 Johnson v. BAE Sys. Land & Armaments, L.P., No. 3:12-CV-1790-D, 2014 WL 1714487,
2014)
30,
Apr.
Tex.
(N.D.
*31
at
("Furthermore, Dr. Ainslie is qualified to offer diagnostic impressions about what impact, if any,
plaintiffs' terminations had on their emotional health."); see supra note 95.
See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Fairness Feuds: Competing Conceptions of Title VII
111
Discriminatory Testing, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2011) ("Research from the field of I/O
psychology--professionally developed methods of analyzing the scientific validity of an employer's test
use and expert knowledge of alternative testing technology with the least racial disparity--is critical to
Title VII disparate impact analysis.").
112 Title VII states that Title VI is violated when "a particular employment practice... causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i).
113
Ernst v. City of Chicago, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ("The question of
adverse impacts of employment testing and alternative testing are certainly in the wheelhouse of the
industrial/organizational psychologist."); United States v. City of Erie, PA, 411 F. Supp. 2d 524, 553
(W.D. Pa. 2005) (finding principals of industrial organizational psychology have relevance in the case);
Bazile v. City of Houston, No. H-08-2404, 2008 WL 4899635, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2008);
Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2003); United States v. City
of Garland, No. Civ.A.3:98-CV-0307-L, 2004 WL 741295, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2004) (using
expert witnesses with degrees in industrial organizational psychology); Davis v. Ala. Dep't of Educ.
Dep't of Disability Determination Serv., 768 F. Supp. 1471, 1482 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (using expert
witnesses in the field of industrial organizational psychology); United States v. State of Del., No.
CIV.A. 01-020-KAJ, 2004 WL 609331, at *7 (D. Del. Mar. 22, 2004) (using an expert witness in the
field of industrial organizational psychology); E.E.O.C. v. Schott N. Am., Inc., No. 06CV1246, 2008
WL 4452715, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2008) (using an expert with a degree in industrial organizational
psychology).
114 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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discrimination if it failed to act.1 15 In concluding that the City in that case
lacked the requisite "strong basis in evidence" to have acted to refuse to
certify exam results, the Court made much of the fact that the City had
retained the services of a company called Industrial/Organizational
Solutions, Inc. ("IOS") in order to develop and give the exams. 1 16
According to the Court, IOS "perform[ed] job analyses to identify the
tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities that are essential for the [relevant]
positions" and "[w]ith the job-analysis information in hand, IOS developed
the .. . examinations to measure the candidates' job related knowledge."' 1 7
Thus, there could be no successful disparate impact suit challenging the
exams because the City would have an unassailable defense: the tests were
a business necessity, as evidenced by their job-relatedness:
There is no genuine dispute that the examinations were job related and
consistent with business necessity.

. .

. The CSB heard statements ...

outlining the detailed steps IOS took to develop and administer the
examinations. IOS devised the written examinations ...
after
painstaking analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions-analyses
in which IOS made sure that minorities were overrepresented.... The
City, moreover, turned a blind eye to evidence that supported the
exams' validity.... IOS stood ready to provide respondents with
detailed information to establish the validity of the exams, but
respondents did not accept that offer.118
The City's assiduous work to use industrial organizational experts in the
preparation of the exams was used (ironically) as evidence that the City
would not have lost the disparate impact case that it feared.119
When it has come, however, to cases that call for some understanding or
modeling of workplace interpersonal mechanics or dynamics, issues that
strike at the heart of human motivation, behavior, and reactions, the
Supreme Court and other courts have rejected the testimony and
information provided by workplace-science experts and their studies, often
criticizing their methodologies and lack of precision.120 For example, in
2011 in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court stated that for

their claims to remain viable, the plaintiffs, who sought to be certified as a
115
Id.
116
Id. at 587-88.
117
Id. at 564-65.
118
Id. at 587-589.
119
See id. at 589.
120
See Bolden v. Walsh Const. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The sort of statistical
evidence that plaintiffs present has the same problem as the statistical evidence in Wal-Mart: it begs the
question.").
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class, needed to show "'significant proof that Wal-Mart 'operated under a
general policy of discrimination,"' such proof was "entirely absent here,"
because "[t]he only evidence of a 'general policy of discrimination' . .
was the testimony of [a] sociological expert" who, "[r]elying on 'social
framework' analysis,. .. testified that Wal-Mart ha[d] a 'strong corporate
culture,' that ma[de] it 'vulnerable' to 'gender bias."'l 2 1 The Court,
however, rejected his testimony because "[h]e could not, . . . 'determine
with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in
122
employment decisions at Wal-Mart."'
Many scholars decried this rejection, and several district courts have
shown a willingness to consider social framework evidence. 1 2 3 Indeed, in
2012, a district court in California accepted as "persuasive" for the
purposes of class certification the testimony of an expert advancing social
framework theory that sought to help plaintiffs employed at Costco
establish that its "culture fosters and reinforces stereotyped thinking, which
allows gender bias to infuse the promotion process from the top down." 24
This testimony, according to the court, "examin[ed] Costco's personnel and
promotion policies and practices in the context of social science literature
and her expertise in workplace discrimination and 'organizational policies
and practices that can mitigate conscious and unconscious stereotyping,
automatic and conscious in group favoritism, and sex bias,"' and posited
that Costco's "CEO and other top executives employ stereotyped thinking
regarding women's roles in society." 125 The expert observed that that
"[c]entralized control, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, creates
and sustains uniformity in the personnel policies and practices throughout
Costco's operational units. This common culture is characterized by
unwritten rules and informal, undocumented personnel practices featuring

&

121
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011).
122 Id. (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154, (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
123
See Andrea Doneff, Social Framework Studies Such as Women Don't Ask and It Does
Hurt to Ask Show Us The Next Step TowardAchieving GenderEquality, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
L. 573, 618 (2014) ("Arguably, the Court's decision in Dukes takes us a step away from holding
employers liable for their unconscious biases."); Marcia L. McCormick, Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart
v. Dukes and the Futureof Class Actions and Employment DiscriminationCases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
711, 723 (2013) ("Yet, while the Dukes majority might agree that facts are capable of empirical testing,
it seems not to countenance the notion that the human decision making process is that kind of fact
because it rejected the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby."); Natalie Bucciarello Pedersen,
The Hazards of Duke: The Substantive Consequences of a ProceduralDecision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV.
123, 141 (2012) ("Given the import of social framework evidence in this field, it will be difficult for
certain types of plaintiffs to support their cases without the introduction and application of social
framework evidence.")
124
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 520 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
125
Id. (quoting Reskin Decl., Docket No. 670, 15).
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discretion by decision makers."l 26 She further "contrasted Costco's
practices with the more formal practices that, social science research
12 7
indicates, 'sustain or reduce barriers to women's career success."'
Other courts in recent years have similarly accepted social framework
evidence submitted by an expert, though courts' treatment of such evidence
has been markedly inconsistent. 128 However, even if the Court is prone to
be dismissive of individual experts' testimony with respect to individual
plaintiffs' claims of discrimination, it should not be similarly dismissive of
social science and its ability to inform its and other courts' understanding
of workplace dynamics and human behavior when it comes to crafting
workable standards, promulgating doctrines, and interpreting the law.
V. QUALITY OF SOURCES

A question will naturally arise as to the quality and type of sources that
courts should use when contemplating real-world modeling of workplace
behavior scenarios. In 1993, the Supreme Court held that rather than
requiring "general acceptance" of the substance of scientific evidence or
testimony, judges, acting as gatekeepers, ought to ensure, as the rules of
evidence require, that it is both relevant and that it rests on a reliable
foundation. 129 As the Court noted:
[I]n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good
grounds," based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a

126
Id. (quoting Reskin Decl., Docket No. 670, ¶ 9).
127
Id. (quoting Reskin Decl., Docket No. 670, ¶ 10).
128
Merrill v. M.I.T.C.H. Charter Sch. Tigard, No. 10-219-HA, 2011 WL 1457461, at *4 (D.
Or. Apr. 4, 2011) ("District courts have not consistently addressed the relevance inquiry for expert
testimony from social psychologists."); see, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339KKC, 2010 WL 583681, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2010) (excluding social psychologist's testimony
because the expert pointed to no evidence of intentional actions based on gender stereotyping at the
specific facility at issue, opined only that gender stereotyping may have occurred, and the testimony
could have confused the jury regarding the burden of proof); Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc.,
592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214-15 (D. Mass. 2009) (admitting social psychologist's testimony that did not
purport to determine whether discrimination occurred under the specific facts of the case, and the
testimony was based on testing and studies); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (admitting social psychologist's testimony about how gender stereotypes may have
affected decisions at the defendant's company); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257, 126264 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (admitting testimony, and stating that evidence of stereotyped remarks constitutes
evidence that gender played a part in an adverse employment decision).
129
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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standard of evidentiary reliability.1 30
Thus, a court should engage in a "preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue. 13 1 We are confident that federal judges possess the
capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry,
and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some
general observations are appropriate." 132 Several inquiries will be relevant
to this assessment, including whether a theory or technique can be and has
been tested, whether it has been "subjected to peer review and publication,"
an assessment of its "known or potential rate of error," the extent of its
acceptance within a particular scientific community, and how flexible it is,
among others. 133

This article focuses on the increased use of scientific sources by courts,
not to apply to particular facts at issue or to generate better fact finding, but
in the course of weighing policy considerations when crafting legal
standards or interpreting the law. That said, although a protracted
discussion of Daubert's applicability in this context is outside the scope of
this piece, it should go without saying that judges ought to select reliable,
sound sources for all purposes and in all contexts and that any such source
would be preferable to judges' own intuition, or unsubstantiated predictions
used for these purposes.1 34
VI. CONCLUSION

As we mark the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII's passage, we measure a
half century of social progress evidenced by the creation and preservation
of equality of opportunity, but we also must acknowledge the statute's
cracks and failings.

130 Id. at 590.
131
Id. at 592-93.
132 Id at 592-93.
133
Id. at 580.
134 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REv. 997, 1024 (2006)
("Daubert stands for the proposition that adjudicative facts should not be based on a psychological
theory unless that theory has been empirically tested, subjected to peer review and publication, has
garnered widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific community, and, where applicable, has a
known and acceptable error rate. But, . . . in elaborating legal doctrines and in applying them in legal
reasoning, judges routinely articulate and apply intuitive psychological theories that satisfy none of
these normative criteria. And once incorporated into legal doctrine, these lay psychological theories can
be quite difficult to modify or uproot.").
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This article calls first for an increased awareness of the workplace
"realities" that dictate the likely behavioral and legal effects of judicial line
drawing or interpretation. Judges should be aware, as Krieger and Fiske
have posited, that consciously or unconsciously they engage in projection
and modeling when evaluating or predicting the real-world ramifications of
a Title VII decision. Yet it is apparent that (1) courts are guided by
hunches, instinct, and speculation - even when empirical evidence is
increasingly available; and (2) the injection of unsubstantiated instinct
regarding workplace dynamics, mechanics, and interactions often renders
the analysis and resultant model incorrect, narrow, and oversimplified.
Litigants should try to do more than simply project the likely incentive
or deterrent effects of an advocated position: they should educate the
judiciary, and, specifically, they should utilize industrial/organizational
psychology where possible to substantiate a prediction about how a given
ruling will impact the American workplace and the state of employment
discrimination jurisprudence. Insight gleaned from this area of science will
lend more credence to the policy arguments of litigants and their amici, and
it will compel judges and their law clerks to at least educate themselves
about what has been proven to occur or what findings have been made as
motivations or behavior in certain scenarios. While policy arguments
grounded in empirically sound social science evidence may not always
prevail, they serve to educate the judiciary and the public. In many cases,
defendants, as well as plaintiffs, will benefit from scientific substantiation
of their predictions about the effect of various decisions on human behavior
in the workplace.
This article calls second for increased transparency in judicial opinions
with respect to workplace realities. This simply means that where policy
considerations weigh heavily, workplace realities should be factored in
more "evenly." Essentially, for example, if any court is going to factor in
the potential "floodgate" effect brought about by exploitative plaintiffs with
sometimes frivolous claims after a plaintiff-friendly construction, it should
also give some shrift to the alternative-the effect that a defendantfriendly, narrow construction or stringent standard may have in terms of
shutting down meritorious cases because of the practical challenges to
proving them or even the impediments created to bringing them. If there is
any validity to these considerations and why they militate toward one
conclusion or another, aerating them on both sides in an opinion only
affords greater transparency and permits a reader to understand how and
why even a good argument may be outweighed by a countervailing
argument or proposition.

